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Is a wholly new start, and a different kind of failure
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Abstract
Brouwer’s Continuity Principle distinguishes intuitionistic m athem atics from 
other varieties of constructive m athem atics, giving it its own flavour. We discuss 
the plausibility of th is assum ption and show how it is used. We explain how one 
may understand its consequences even if one hesitates to  accept it as an axiom.
1 Brouwer’s Continuity Principle
We let N be the set of all natural numbers. Its elements 0 ,1 ,2 , . . .  are produced one 
by one. N is a never finished project th a t is executed step-by-step.
We let Aí be the set of all infinite sequences of natural numbers.
The acceptance of TV as a totality  has been a m ajor step in the history of mathematical 
thinking, and led to  the development of set theory. W ith Cantor’s diagonal argument 
in mind, Brouwer probed the meaning of the words: “every possible infinite sequence 
of natural numbers” and found a way to  sensibly use them.
An element a  of Aí is a function from N to N, a  = a ( 0 ) ,a ( l ) ,a ( 2 ) , . . .  Every such 
element is produced step-by-step, and like the set N itself, it is a never finished project. 
The production process may consist in the evaluation of an algorithm, like:
The sequence 0 with the constant value 0:
0 (0) =  0 , 0 (1) =  0 , 0 (2) =  0 , . . .
or:
1
d, the decimal expansion of n: 
d(0) =  1, d( 1) =  4, d(2) =  1 ,. . .
or:
exam p leo:
for each n, exam ple0(n) =  1 if there is no i < n  such th a t for each j  < 99, 
d(i + j )  =  9 but for each j  <  99, d(n + j) = 9, and exam ple0(n) =  0 otherwise.
Brouwer suggested also the following non-algorithmic project, 
exam p lei :
for each n, exam p lei (n) =  0 as long as we do not find a proof th a t for each j ,  
ex a m p lo o  (j ) =  0, and exam p lei (n) =  1 otherwise.
exam p lei is unusual and strange; it depends on one’s future mathematical experience
and requires a subdivision of (part of) the mathematical future into stages 0, 1 , 2 , ___
Even if one doubts th a t this could be done in a sensible way, the example may make 
clear tha t we are prepared to recognize all kinds of projects for constructing step-by- 
step an infinite sequence of natural numbers.
We even give up the idea tha t there must be a “rule” or a “secret” guiding the devel­
opment of such a sequence. It suffices tha t we fulfil our intention to construct a next 
value every time, tha t is, we may create a sequence by freely choosing its successive 
values. The result of such a free step-by-step construction may be a disappointingly 
regular sequence like the sequence 0. There is no obligation to demonstrate one’s 
freedom by avoiding every repetitive pattern of behaviour. We believe th a t every 
infinite sequence may be imagined to be the result of a free step-by-step construction.
We now discuss the Continuity Principle.
Let f i Ç A ' x N b e a  relation between infinite sequences of natural numbers and 
natural numbers. If the pair (a, to) belongs to R, we write aRrn  and say: “to is 
suitable for a ” .
Suppose we feel entitled to claim the following:
For every a  in Aí there exists to in N such th a t aRrn.
This is a strong claim for the following two reasons:
(i) We take seriously the expression: “for every a  in A/”” .
We in no way want to delimit the range of this quantifier and in particular allow 
infinite sequences that grow step-by-step by free choices.
(ii) We take seriously the expression: “there exists to in N” .
Given any a  we must be able to construct and produce a natural number to 
suitable for a , and a natural number is a finite object.
Strong claims need strong evidence and thus may be seen to have strong implications. 
We argue as follows: if a  is coming into existence step-by-step and we calculate a 
number to suitable for a , the construction of this number to will be completed when 
only finitely many values of a  have been decided upon. The number to will be suitable 
not only for a  itself but for every infinite sequence ß  th a t has these first finitely many 
values the same as a.
Let us summarize our conclusion, (we use m , n , . .. as variables over the set N of 
natural numbers):
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1.1 Brouwer’s Continuity Principle:
For every R  C Ai x  N, 
if Va € A i 3to [aRrn],
then Va € Ai 3n  3m  V/3 G Ai [ if for every i < n, a ( i) =  ß(i), then ßRrn}.
This axiom is called Brouwer’s principle for numbers in Kleene and Vesley 1965 
and W C  — N in Troelstra and van Dalen 1988.
The Continuity Principle is a natural axiom, borne out by experience. We never were 
in a situation in which we found reason to  affirm the premiss but hesitated to  uphold 
the conclusion.
Brouwer, when using it, considers it as evident and after having mentioned the possi­
bility of creating an infinite sequence by successive choices, offers no further apology. 
In Heyting 1952/53, some explication is given, not very different from the one we 
sketched.
Kleene and Vesley 1965 prove the consistency of their formal system of intuitionistic 
analysis including the continuity principle by making use of a non-intended realizabil­
ity interpretation.
The Continuity Principle changes the landscape of mathematics.
Brouwer is offering us a pair of spectacles and promising new vistas. We should not 
only study the spectacles but also put them on and describe what we see.
2 The continuity of real functions
The continuity of real functions is an immediate consequence of Brouwer’s Continuity 
Principle, as we showed in Veldman 1982. We now repeat this argument.
We first formulate a generalization of the principle th a t easily follows from the prin­
ciple itself.
2.1 Let X  be a subset of Ai. X  will be called a spread if and only if the following 
two conditions are satisfied:
(i) For every finite sequence s = (s(0 ) , . . .  ,s (n  — 1)) of natural numbers one may 
decide if there exists a  in X  such th a t for each i < n, a ( i) =  s(i).
(ii) For every a  in Ai, if for each n  in N there exists ß  in X  such th a t for each i < n ,  
a (i) =  ß(i), then a  itself belongs to  X .
A spread is a closed subset of Baire space Aí th a t satisfies the classically empty 
condition (i).
2.2 Brouwer’s Continuity Principle, general formulation:
For every spread X  C Aí, for every R  C X  x N, 
if Va € X  3to [aRrn],
then Va 6 X  3n 3to V/3 € X  [if for every i < n, a ( i) =  ß(i), then ßR m \.
One may prove 2.2 from 1.1 by defining a so-called retraction of TV onto X , th a t is, 
a continuous function r  from Aí onto X  such th a t for every a  in X , r  (a) =  a , and 
then arguing straightforwardly.
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We have to  say something on real numbers.
2.3 Let q o ,q i,. .. be an enumeration of the set Q of the rational numbers. For the 
purposes of this paper, an element a  of Aí will be called a canonical rea,I number if 
and only if, for each n, \qa(n) — <7a (ra+i)l < - let R be the set of all canonical 
real numbers. Observe th a t R is a spread.
2.4  We now define the binary relation of real coincidence on the set R.
Let a, ß  be canonical real numbers. We say th a t a  really coincides with ß, notation 
a  = r  ß, if and only if, for each n, \a(n) — ß (n ) | < 2¿ r -  We don’t  go into the 
definition of the usual operations on the set R. We want to  make use of the following 
observation:
For all canonical real numbers a , ß, for every natural number n  if \a—ß\ < i^ r - ,  
then there exists a canonical real number 7  such th a t for each i < n, a ( i ) =  7 (*) 
and 7  = r  ß.
2.5 A rea,I function  ƒ is an effective method th a t associates to  every canonical real 
number a  a canonical real number ƒ (a) in such a way that, for all a , ß  in R, if a  = r  ß, 
then f ( a )  = R f (ß) .
2.6 Theorem : (Continuity of real functions)
Let ƒ be a real function.
Then Va € R Vto 3n 'iß  € R [if |a  — ß\ < then | / ( a )  — f ( ß)  | < ^ -].
Proof: Let ƒ be a real function and a  a canonical real number, and m  a natural 
number.
Applying 2.2, we calculate n, such th a t for every 7  in R, if for each i < n, a ( i) =  7 (*), 
then ( / (a ) )  (to +  2) =  (ƒ (7 )) (to +  2), therefore | ƒ (a) — ƒ (7 )! < jèr.
Observe that, for every canonical real number ß, if \a — ß\ < then there exists a 
canonical real number 7  such th a t for every i < n, a(i) = 7 (*), and ß  = r  7 , therefore 
f i ß )  = r / ( 7 )> and I ƒ (a) — f(ß)\ <
2.7  It is possible to  generalize the result of Theorem 2.6.
Let D  be a subset of R. D  will be called a domain of continuity if every real function 
from D  to  R is continuous, th a t is, for every function ƒ from D  to  R, if for all a , ß  in 
D  such th a t a  = r  ß, also ƒ (a) = r  f (ß) ,  then Va € D  Vto 3 n V ß  £ D  [if |a  — ß\ < 
then | / ( a )  -  f (ß) \  < ^ ] .
2.8  We let Perhaps (Q) be the set of all canonical real numbers a  th a t change their 
value at most one time, th a t is, for all i, k,  if * < k and a( i ) ^  a(i  + 1 ), then 
a(i  +  1 ) =  a(k).
4
2.9 Let bo, h , . . .  be an enumeration of the set of all binary rational numbers. 
We let Bin be the set of all canonical real numbers a  such that for all i, k, if 6, < a(i), 
then bí < a(i + k), and if a(i) < b(i), then a(i + k) < b(i).
Observe that every a  in Bin has a binary development. Conversely, if a  in R has a 
binary development, then there exists 7  in Bin such that a  = r  7 .
2.10 T heorem :
(i) Perhaps (Q) is a domain of continuity.
(ii) Bin is a domain of continuity.
Proof: Observe that both Perhaps (Q) and Bin are spreads and repeat the argument 
by which we established Theorem 2.6.
3 S trong  counter-exam ples
Brouwer’s attack upon classical logic started with the observation that upon his in­
terpretation of the logical connectives we have no reason to affirm the principle of 
excluded third, P  V -1 P.
For instance, we have no reason to affirm either: exam ple0 =  0 or: -> (exam ple0 = 
0), therefore we have no reason to affirm: exam ple0 =  0 V -i(exam ple0 =  0).
This does not mean that the assumption exam ple0 =  0 V -> (exam ple0 =  0) leads 
to a contradiction; on the contrary, one may prove, in intuitionistic logic, for every 
proposition P, - 1-1 (P  V ->F).
The Continuity Principle brings home to us that the assumption that we could decide, 
for every a  in Aí, if a = 0 or ->(a = 0 ), is contradictory indeed.
3.1 T heorem : (Absurdity ofthe Principle of Excluded Third)
-■Va € Aí [a =  0 V -i(a =  0)].
Proof: Assume Va € Ai [a =  0V ^  (a =  0)].
Applying the Continuity Principle we find n such that 
either for every a  in Aí, if for every i < n, a (i) =  0 , then a  =  0 , 
or for every a  in Aí, if for every i < n, a (i) =  0 , then ->(a =  0).
Both alternatives are absurd.
This technique can be applied more generally. Once we have found an example that 
shows that we may be unable to take a decision of some given kind, it very often 
will be possible to derive a contradiction from the assumption that we should have a 
general method to take that kind of decision. The following Theorem offers a second 
example.
3.2 T heorem : (Negative Continuity Theorem)
There is no real function ƒ such that, for each positive n, ƒ (¿-) =  0 and
ƒ (  0) =  1.
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Proof: Assume there exists such a function.
Let t : N —¥ N be such that for each positive n, qt(n) = We now define a real 
number ß  as follows:
for each n, if for each i < n, exam ple0(*) =  0 , then ß(n) = t(n), and if there exists 
i < n such that exam ple0(*) ^  0 , then ß(n) = t(io) where io is the least i such that 
exam ple0(*) ^  0.
Observe that, if exam ple0 =  0, then ß  = r  0 and f (ß)  = 1 and if exam ple0 ^  0, 
then f (ß)  = 0 .
So we are unable to calculate f (ß) ,  even approximately, as we are unable to decide 
f (ß)  > 0 or f (ß)  < 1 .
Generalizing this example, we may define, for every a  in Aí, a suitable canonical real 
number ß  with the property: if a = 0 , then f (ß)  = 1 and if a  ^  0 , then f (ß)  = 0 . 
We may decide either f (ß)  > 0 or f (ß)  < 1, therefore either a = 0 or a  ^  0.
We obtain a contradiction by Theorem 3.1.
3.3  We have included Theorem 3.2 for historical reasons.
In the first Section of Brouwer 1927, Brouwer proves the Negative Continuity Theo­
rem, but he proves it in the weak sense only: there cannot be such a function because 
if we had one, then we could solve some problem for which we do not have a solution. 
Brouwer fails to distinguish carefully between this weak negation and the stronger 
one, which says that the negated proposition would lead to a contradiction. If one 
wants to prove the Negative Continuity Theorem in this strong sense, one needs the 
Continuity Principle.
But why should one prove the Negative Continuity Theorem rather than the Con­
tinuity Theorem 2.6 itself, if one is prepared to use the Continuity Principle? (The 
Negative Continuity Theorem of course easily follows from Theorem 2.6.)
Brouwer probably felt doubtful about the argument we used for proving Theorem 2.6. 
He does not state a Continuity Theorem and, in Brouwer 1927, goes on to prove, by 
a far more complicated argument, that every real function from the closed interval 
[0 , 1] to R must be uniformly continuous.
It is remarkable that something like our argument for Theorem 2.6 is used in Heyt- 
ing 1952/53, but Charles Parsons, writing, in 1967, an introductory note to Brouwer 
1927, explicitly but unconvincingly disputes the correctness of this reasoning.
4 B rouw er’s first app lication
Brouwer 1918 contains a formulation of the Continuity Principle together with the 
following application:
4.1 T heorem :
There is no injective function from Aí to N.
Proof: Let ƒ be a function from Aí to N.
Determine n such that for each a  in Aí, if for each i < n, a (i) =  0, then f (a)  = /(O).
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Obviously, ƒ is not injective.
4.2 Cantor’s argument is valid intuitionistically and does not depend on the Conti­
nuity Principle:
For every function ƒ : N —¥ Aí  there exists a  in Aí  such that for each n, 
f ( n ) ^  a. Define a  as follows: for each n, a(n ) := (f(n))(n) + 1.
This argument does not prove Theorem 4.1.
4.3 Brouwer 1918 introduces the following notion:
Let X,  Y  be sets. We define: X  is smaller than Y , or: Y  is greater than X ,  notation 
X  c  Y , if and only there exists an injective function from X  to Y  and there does not 
exist an injective function from Y  to X .
Brouwer observes that C is a transitive relation between sets and that N is smaller 
than Aí.
There is a slight ambiguity in the notion “smaller than” , as we may take the notion 
of an injective function in (at least) two senses, whenever a constructive inequality or 
apartness relation is present.
For the theorems we want to prove in this paper it does not make any difference which 
interpretation we choose.
4.4 We want to show that Theorem 4.1 admits of a vast extension.
We let N* be the set of all finite sequences of natural numbers. We let * denote 
the binary operation of concatenation of finite sequences and also the operation of 
concatenating a finite and an infinite sequence of natural numbers.
Let T  be the set of all a  in Aí that assume no other values than 0,1, and assume the 
value 1 at most one time.
Here is an infinite sequence of elements of T  :
0, (1)*0, <0,1) *0, (0,0,1) * 0, ...
This sequence is an injective function from N into T.
Remark that exam ple0 belongs to T  but we do not know where it occurs in the 
above sequence.
Observe that T  is a spread and use the argument from the proof of Theorem 4.1 in 
order to see that there is no injective function from T  into N. (In particular, the 
above sequence is not an enumeration of T.) So N is smaller than T.
4.5 For every s in N*, every subset X  of Aí we define: s * X  := { s * a | a € l } .  For 
all subsets X , Y  of Aí we define: X  ® Y  := (0) * X  U (1) * Y . For every subset X  of 
Aí we define a sequence 0 ■ X , 1 ■ X , 2 ■ X , . . .  of subsets of Aí, as follows: 0 • X  := 0 
and, for each n, (n + 1) • X  := (n ■ X )  ® X.  For each a  in Ai, n in N, we define: 
a(n) := (a(0 ),. . .  a(n — 1)). If confusion is unlikely to arise, we write an  rather than 
a(n).
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4.6 Theorem :
For each n, n ■ T  c  (n + 1) • T.
Proof: We first show: T  c  T  ® T. Observe that T is a subset of T  ® T.
Assume now that ƒ is an injective function from T ®T into T. Observe that ƒ (0) =  0. 
For assume, for some to, (ƒ (0)) (to) =  1. Calculate n such that for all a  in T, if for all 
i < n, a (i) =  0, then (ƒ(«)) (to) =  (/(O)) (to), and ƒ (a) =  ƒ( 0). So ƒ is not injective. 
For similar reasons, / ( ( l )  * 0) =  0. So ƒ is not injective.
Observe that, for each n, n ■ T  is a subset of (n + 1) • T. Assume now that for some n, 
ƒ is an injective function from (n + 1) • T  into n ■ T. Observe, by repeating the above 
argument, that ƒ has to map each one of the sequences (1) * 0,. . .  , On * (1) * 0 onto 
one of the sequences (1 ) * 0 , . . .  , 0 (n — 1 ) * (1 ) * 0 , and so cannot be injective.
4.7 For every subset X  of Aí, we let X  be the set of all a  in Aí such that for each 
n in N there exists ß  in X  such that ßn = an.
X  is called the closure of X .
X  will be a spread provided we are able to decide for each s in N*, if there exists a 
in X  such that, for some n, an = s.
We now define a sequence T0, T\, T2, . . .  of subsets of Aí, as follows:
T0 := {0 } and for each to, Tm+i := (J On * (1) * Tm
n £  N
Observe that each Tm is a spread and that TÌ coincides with the set T  introduced in 
Section 4.4. For each to, Tm is the set of all a  in Aí that assume no other values than 
0,1 and that assume the value 1 at most to times. For each n, to, n • Tm is a subset 
of  ^l u..i  •
4.8 T heorem :
For each n, to, n • Tm C (n +  1) • Tm c  Tm+i.
Proof: We show that T2 is smaller than T2 0  T2 and leave the rest of the proof to the 
reader.
Observe that T2 is a subset of T2 ® T2, and that, for each n , n - T \  is a subset of T2, 
so, in view of Theorem 4.6, n • TÌ C T2.
Assume that ƒ is an injective function from T2 ® T2 into T2. Observe that ƒ(0) =  0. 
For assume, for some to, (/(0))(to) =  1. Calculate n such that for each a  in T2, if 
for all i < n, a(i) = 0 then (ƒ(«)) (to +  1) =  (/(0 ))(to  +  1). Now define a mapping 
g from T2 into Aí  as follows: for each ß in T2, f (ß)  is the sequence 7  such that 
/(On * ß) = /(O )(to +  1) * 7 . Observe that g embeds T2 into T\. Contradiction.
For similar reasons / ( ( l )  * 0) =  0. So ƒ is not injective.
4.9 Theorem 4.8 admits of a further refinement.
Consider the countable ordinal ujm. It consists of all polynomials ur”° • p0 + uj-ni ■ 
Pi + ■ ■ ■ + u)-nk- 1 • pk-i  where (nQ, n i , . . .  ,n u - 1 ) is a strictly decreasing sequence of 
natural numbers and (po,Pi, • • • ,Pu-1 ) is a finite sequence of natural numbers of the
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same length k.
We may associate a subset o f TV to any such polynomial by defining: T  (u>'n° • po + u>'ni ■ pi + ■ ■ ■ 
+ur” fe- 1 • pk~i) := Po • Tno ® pi ■ Tni ® . . .  ® pk^i ■ Tnk_1. Let < denote the usual 
ordering on ujm .
4.10 Theorem :
For all a ,ß  in u>M, if a < ß, then T(a) C T(ß).
Proof: We leave the straightforward proof to the reader.
4.11 These considerations may of course be extended further into the transfinite.
Suppose we have a sequence Uo, Ui, . . .  of spreads such that for each n, Un C Un+1 .
Define V := |J  0(n) * (1) * Un and observe: for each n, Un C V  and n-V  C (n+l)-V.
» G N
5 A m odel-theore tic  observation
5.1 We consider sentences in the first-order-language of equality.
Let X,  Y  be sets. We define: X  differs elementarily from Y  if there exists a sentence 
ip in the first-order-language of equality such that (X) \= ip and (Y) | -k/?.
The sets N and Aí are elementarily different: consider the sentence VarVy [x = yV^(x  = 
y)] and recall Theorem 3.1. (When interpreting such a sentence, we use Tarski’s truth 
definition, but of course understand connectives and quantifiers intuitionistically.)
The sets T  and Aí  are also elementarily different.
Observe that for all a  in T,  either a = (1) * 0 or not: a = (1) * 0 and that for every 
ß  in Aí, not for all a  in Aí, either a = ß  or not: a = ß. So the sentence 3x Vy 
[x = y V -i(x =  y)] is true in the structure (T) but not in the structure (N).
5.2 Theorem :
For all a , ß  in , if a  < ß, then T(a) differs elementarily from T(ß).
Proof: We define a sequence Undeco, Undeci, . . .  of formulas in the first-order-language 
of equality as follows:
Undeco(a;) := -iVxi [x = xi V -i(x =  xi)], and for each n:
Undec„+i(a;) := Undec„(a;) A ~^Vxn + 2 [Undec„(a;„+2) —>■(£ =  i n+2 V -i(x =  £„+2))].
(We assume that x, xo, x i , . . .  are different individual variables of our language.)
For any formula ip = ip(x) we use 3!x[</?(x)] as an abbreviation of the formula 
3a: [ip(x) A Vy [ip{y) y = x]].
Observe that the sentence 3!a;[Undeco(a;)] is true in (Ti) but not in (2 -TÌ), observe that 
the sentence 3a; 3y [ar ^  yAUndeco(a;) AlJndeco(y) AVz [Undeco(z) —ï ( z  = x V z  = y)] 
is true in (2 • TÌ) but not in (3 • Tì), observe that, for each n, the set of all a  in Tn+i 
satisfying the formula Undeco coincides with Tn, observe that for each n, the sentence 
3a: [Undec„(a;)] is true in Tn+i but not in Tn and now complete the proof yourself.
9
Some intuitionistic model theory is developed in Veldman and Jansen 1990 and Veld­
man and Waaldijk 1996.
6 B eginning th e  B orei h ierarchy
6.1 Let X  be a subset of the set R of canonical real numbers. We define: X  is basic 
open if and only if there exists q in Q and n in N such that X  =  {a\a  € R| \a—q\ < ^-}. 
X  is open or S j  if and only if there exists a sequence X 0, X i , . . .  of basic open sets 
such that X  = (JnGNX„.
X is closed or I lJ  if and only if there exists an open set Y such that X  =  R \Y .
X is positively Borei if X  may be obtained from open and closed sets by means of the 
repeated application of the operations of countable union and countable intersection. 
X  is if and only if there exists a sequence X 0, X i , . . .  of closed sets such that
x = u xn.
n  GN
X is n °  if and only if there exists a sequence X 0, X i , . . .  of open sets such that
X= f] x n.
n £  N
The study of the positively Borei sets starts with the observation that neither one of 
the classes II®, indudes the other.
6.2 We let R a t be the set of all canonical real numbers a  such that there exists a 
real rational number q with the property: for each n, |qa(n) ~ QÌ < 2¿ t -
We let P o s lrr  be the set of all canonical real numbers a  such that for each n, qa^n) < 
<3a(2«+2) < <3a(2«+3) < <3a(2»+i) and either qn < qa{2n) or qa{2n+1) < in ­
observe that for every a  in P o s lrr , every q in Q there exists n such that |n — c/| > 
that is, a  is positively irrational.
Conversely, every positively irrational real number really coincides with an element 
of P oslrr.
Observe that P o s lrr  is a spread.
Observe that R a t is and that the set of all positively irrational canonical real 
numbers is a II® subset of R.
6.3 Theorem :
For every sequence Go, G i , . . .  of open sets,
if R a t C Q Gn, there exists a  in P o s lrr  such that a £ Ç] Gn.
» G N  » g n
Proof: Let Go,Gi , . . .  be a sequence of open sets such that R a t C Q Gn. We
nEN
construct step by step a canonical real number a  satisfying the condition: for each n, 
Qa(2n) < Qa(2n+2 ) < Qa(2 n+3) < Qa(2 n+i)- Let n be a natural number and suppose we 
defined already
a(0), a ( l ) , . . .  , a(2n — 2), a(2n — 1 ), such that qa(2n - 2) < Qa(2n - i)•
We then define qa(2n) and Qa(2n+i) in a way that
Qa(2 n - 2) < <la(2n) < Qa(2n+i) < Qa(2n-i) and either qn < qa(2n) or qa(2 n+i) < (In and
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the open interval {qa(2 n)-,cla(2n+i)) is a subset of Gn and qa(2 n+i) — <la(2n) <
It will be clear that a  is positively irrational and belongs to every Gn.
m
6.4 Theorem :
For every sequence /•',). l-'\__ of closed sets,
if P o s lrr  C (J Fn, there exists a  in R a t such that a £ ÌJ Fn.
n G N  n G N
Proof: Let F0, F i , . . .  be a sequence of closed sets such that P o s lrr  C (J Fn. Let
nEN
«o be some element of P o s lrr . We recall that P o s lrr  is a spread, and apply the 
Continuity Principle. Determine to, n such that for all a  in P o s lrr , if a(2to) = 
So(2to), then a  belongs to Fn. Now every positively irrational number from the 
open interval (qao(2m -2)-, Qa0(2 m-i))  will belong to the closed set Fn, and the closed 
interval [qao(2 m -2 )iQa0(2m -i)] will be a subset of Fn and Fn will contain many rational 
numbers.
6.5 Observe that Theorem 6.4 depends on the Continuity Principle, and that The­
orem 6.3 does not but is proved by a straightforward “Baire Category” argument. 
Theorem 6.3 shows that there exist E° sets that are not II®. The Continuity Princi­
ple enables one to prove that there are easier examples.
6 .6  Theorem :
The set [0,1] U [1,2] is E° but not II®.
Proof: The set [0,1] U [1, 2] is obviously E®, so it suffices to show that it is not II®. 
Let Go, G i , . . .  be a sequence of open sets such that [0,1] U [1,2] =  P| Gn. Observe
nEN
that for each n, [0,2] C Gn, therefore [0,2] =  [0,1] U [1,2]. Therefore, for every a  in 
R, either a  < 0 or 0 < a.
Consider the element o¡o of R defined by: for all n, ao(n) =  (—| )  • Applying the 
Continuity Principle we determine n such that either for all a  in R, if Txqn = an, then 
a  < 0, or for all a  in R, 5on = an, then 0 < a.
Both alternatives are absurd.
6.7 The problem of establishing the second level of the Borei hierarchy was consid­
ered by Brouwer around 1924, see Brouwer 1991, and Veldman 200? One of his proofs 
is somewhat circuitous and not wholly correct.
7 B orei h ierarchy  theorem s
7.1 We now consider Baire space M. A subset X  of M  is called basic open if and 
only if there exists s in N* such that X  is the set of all a  in Aí with the property:
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for some n, an = s. We define open, closed and positively Borei subsets of TV like the 
corresponding subsets of R in Section 6.1.
7.2 Let X , Y  be subsets of Aí. We define: X  reduces to Y  if and only if there exists 
a continuous function ƒ from Aí to Aí such that for every a, a  belongs to X  if and 
only if f (a)  belongs to Y.
We also define: X  is strongly irreducible to Y  if and only if for every continuous 
function ƒ from Aí to Aí, if ƒ maps X  into Y , then ƒ also maps some element of A f\X  
into Y .
We now state without proof:
7.3 T heorem : (Intuitionistic Borei Hierarchy Theorem)
For every positively Borei set P  there exists a positively Borei set Q such that 
Q is strongly irreducible to P.
7.4 The Continuity Principle plays a key rôle in the proof of Theorem 7.3. We may 
elucidate this rôle as follows.
For very many positively Borei set P  one may construct a continuous function h, from 
Aí to Aí such that P = Ran (ft).
Suppose we are given Borei sets P,Q  and continuous functions ho, hi from Aí to Aí, 
such that P = Ran(fto) and Q = Ran(fti), and also a continuous function ƒ from Aí 
to Aí mapping P  into Q.
Aí ■ ■ Aí
i ho i hl 
Ai — y Aí 
ƒ
Observe that for every a  there exists ß such that f (ho(a)) = hi(ß).  The Continuity 
Principle leads one to suspect: there exists a continuous function g from Aí to Aí such 
that hi o g = ƒ o ho- There is a stronger form of the Continuity Principle that gives 
exactly this conclusion, but in the actual proof, our version of the Principle suffices. 
In any case, the fact that ƒ maps P  into Q is taken very seriously: we require strong 
evidence for it.
The above picture may help one to see the meaning of the Intuitionistic Borei Hier­
archy Theorem, which is very different from the meaning of the Hierarchy Theorem 
proved by Borei and Lebesgue.
7.5 Cantor space C is the set of all a  in Aí that assume no other values than 0,1. We 
introduce two subsets of Cantor space, F in ite  and A lm ostfin ite . We studied these 
sets in Veldman 1995. F in ite  is the set of all a  in C such that 3n Vto > n [«(to) =  0]. 
A lm ostfin ite  is the set of all a  in C such that for every strictly increasing sequence 
7  of natural numbers there exists n such « (7 (n)) =  0. Observe that a  belongs to 
F in ite  if and only if a  is the characteristic function of a finite subset N.
7.6 T heorem : (Intuitionistic Borei Hierarchy Theorem,, Second Version)
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For every positively Borei set P  there exists a positively Borei set Q such that 
Q is strongly irreducible to P  and F in ite  C Q C A lm ostfinite.
From a classical point of view, the result is surprising as, with classical logic, the 
sets F in ite  and A lm ostfin ite  coincide.
A lm ostfin ite  is a subset of N o tno tfin ite , that is, the set of all a  in C such that 
-i-i(a € F in ite), the statement that these two sets coincide is equivalent with the 
(implausible) generalized Markov principle.
It follows from the Theorem that the set A lm ostfin ite  is not positively Borei.
The Theorem establishes the Borei hierarchy and at the same time shows in a spec­
tacular way the expressiveness of intuitionistic logic.
7.7 Let a ,ß  belong to Cantor space C. We define: a admits ß if and only if, for 
each n, a(ßn) = 0. (We are assuming that finite sequences of natural numbers are 
coded by natural numbers and do not distinguish between a finite sequence of natural 
numbers and its code number.)
As in Veldman 1999, we let Share(T) be the set of all a  in C that admit a member of 
T,  and in this sense, share a member with T. Observe that Share(T) is a spread, as 
for every a  in C, a  belongs to Share(T) if and only if for each n there exists 7  in T  
such that a fin )  = 0. Observe that for every a  in Share(T), if either 3n [a (On) ^  0] 
or -d n  [a(0n) ^  0], then a  belongs to Share(T), so in any case, —■—■(« € Share(T)), 
therefore Share(T) coincides with S hare(T)~'~', the double complement of Share(T) 
in C.
7.8 T heorem : (Intuitionistic Borei Hierarchy Theorem,, Third Version)
For every positively Borei set P  there exists a positively Borei set Q such that 
Q is irreducible to P  and Share (T) C Q C Share (T).
Observe that we are a bit more careful than in Theorem 7.6, as we do not require that 
Q is strongly irreducible to P. It follows from Theorem 7.8 that the set Share(T) is 
not positively Borei. Observe that, classically, A lm ostfin ite  is and Share(T) is
n?.
Theorems 7.6 and 7.8 are fascinating consequences of the Continuity Principle. We 
intend to prove them in a future paper. Theorem 7.3 is proved in Veldman 200?
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